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PLURALISM AND REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
SHARING ECONOMY
Erez Aloni
Abstract: Providers use platforms in dissimilar ways. Some providers
create new capacity and designate it for exclusively commercial use via
platforms. For example, a provider buys a car that serves predominantly for
driving paying passengers, converts a standard residential rental to a shortterm rental, or works full-time via a platform. Conversely, other providers
leverage their idle capacity and monetize it (e.g., a provider uses the family
car to drive platform passengers in the evenings). This chapter argues that
the distinction between new and idle capacity is a fundamental concept that
should guide regulation of activities in the platform economy. Creating new
capacity for platform use creates negative externalities that are likely to
reduce choices for consumers and providers. Examples include reduction in
the availability of traditional services (e.g., hotels, taxies), decline in
availability of standard residential rentals, and cutbacks in protected
employment opportunities. However, putting excess capacity to platform
use produces lower negative externalities and can bring benefits: increasing
the availability of flexible employment opportunities and expanding
consumer market choice. The chapter deploys the theory of pluralism to
support regulation that increases employee and consumer choices but also
curbs harms attendant to the platforms and protects traditional services and
institutions that are important to society.

INTRODUCTION
Not all activities in the platform economy are commensurate. Some
nonprofessional providers perform activities infrequently and through
increased excess capacity (that is, using their surplus goods, time, or
skills). Conversely, specialized providers conduct other activities at a
commercial pace by harnessing assets designated primarily for the
exchanges. The first set of activities, which I call “work in increased use
of excess capacity,” generates more valuable choice to consumers and
workers and often produces fewer negative externalities. The latter type
of activity sometimes results, or risks resulting, in reduced choice for
workers and consumers and often leads to more negative externalities than
 Assistant Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia.
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the first type. In this chapter I flesh out the differences between the two
kinds of activity and argue that their dissimilarities warrant divergent
regulatory responses.
Recent scholarship advancing a theory of pluralism in private law helps
to show why the different activities deserve dissimilar regulatory regimes.
Consequently, I build on existing literature about pluralistic theory, and
develop it further, enlisting its principles to guide the regulation of the
platform economy. As I explain below, pluralism charges that the state
support increased choice for individuals by facilitating alternative
economic and social spheres that embody diverse values. Promoting
choice, however, does not mean deregulation but, rather, requires that the
state establish a set of different valuable alternatives that safeguard
individuals from possible free-market harms. Because work grounded in
increased use of excess capacity engenders more choice for consumers
and workers, pluralistic principles suggest that the state should encourage
these kinds of activities by tailoring regulation to the activities in this
category. By the same token, because commercial activities that are not
based in increased use of excess capacity yield more negative externalities
including reduced choice, lawmakers should adopt more rigorous and
protective set of regulations to restrain such harms.
In what follows, I briefly canvass the origins, development, and
principles of pluralistic theory. Next, I argue that we should distinguish
between activities in the platform economy, based on where they fall on a
spectrum of use of excess capacity. I submit that platform-generated
activities that leverage increased use of excess capacity promote valuable
choice, whereas activities that gravitate toward commercial work with
little or no increased use of excess capacity can decrease it. Finally, I use
pluralistic theory to underpin my suggestions for the regulation of
economic activities facilitated by platforms.
A note about terminology: naming the economic model at stake is a
source of fierce and important debate and is not an issue of mere
semantics. Because “sharing” is a misnomer, and “gig” economy
describes only part of the activities that platforms facilitate (further, its
use distracts attention from commercial activities that are a big part of
such activities), I employ the more neutral term “platform economy.”1
1 See Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397,
1406–07 (2016) (critiquing the existing definitions of the platform economic).
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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMY-BASED
PLURALISM

The term “pluralism” has various meanings in legal academia and other
academic disciplines. The version of pluralistic theory that I build on and
develop here is an extension of various scholarly investigations. I refer
particularly to “autonomy-based pluralism,” a theoretical approach that
Hanoch Dagan explicated, primarily by relying on the seminal work of
Joseph Raz on the connection between autonomy and pluralism.
For Raz, personal autonomy (to distinguish from moral autonomy) is
both instrumentally valuable and a constituent of well-being because it
enables individuals to control, navigate, and create good lives.
Alternatively, in Raz’s favorite metaphor, it enables them to be the authors
of their own lives. Hence, the life of an autonomous person “is, in part, of
his own making.”2 When individuals can shape their own lives, their selfdefinition and self-realization become conceivable; this, in turn, means
that they can maximize their potential.3 Raz proposes three conditions that
are necessary to exercise such personal autonomy: first, an individual
must have the mental and physical capabilities required to make rational
choices and carry them out; second, individuals must be independent in
their choices, which means they must be free from coercion and
manipulation; third, an autonomous person must have an adequate range
of choices from which to choose.4
Most important to this account is the third condition. In order to lead
an autonomous life, having a choice and the ability to exercise choice are
not sufficient conditions for autonomy: an adequate range of choices is a
requisite condition. To illustrate, a man trapped in a pit with enough food
for survival has the capacity to exercise choice but not enough options to
live an autonomous life.5 Raz states, “A person is autonomous only if he
has a variety of acceptable options available to him to choose from, and
his life became as it is through his choice of some of these options.”6 An
“adequate range” does not mean the quantity but the variety of
alternatives. Many choices of the commensurate thing do not satisfy this
2

Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 204 (1986).
Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, in
7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 202 (P. French, T. Uehling & H. Wettstein eds.
1982).
4 Raz, supra note 2, at 373.
5 Id. at 373-4.
6 Id. at 204.
3
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requirement.7
Valuing autonomy in this sense, Raz maintains, requires adoption of
moral pluralism, “the view that there are various forms and styles of life
which exemplify different virtues and which are incompatible.”8 This
view endorses the existence of various incompatible and valuable
pursuits, relationships, and commitments that individuals can choose from
as a means to exercise their autonomy. Razian pluralistic principles thus
assume a meaningful range of worthwhile options as a precondition for
autonomy. Worthwhile choices do not exist if a buyer can only choose
from among a hundred similar houses; an adequate choice would be
among a townhouse, an urban flat, and a suburban house.
This conception of autonomy-based pluralism leads Raz to the final
relevant observation: the state’s role is to enable conditions that allow
people to be the authors of their own lives. Hence, to ensure adequacy of
choice, it is not enough that the state be committed to noninterference;
rather, it is obligated to “create conditions which enable [its] subjects to
enjoy greater liberty than they otherwise would.”9
Building on the Razian conceptions of autonomy and pluralism,
Dagan’s recent work espouses pluralistic principles as the foundation for
private-law theory.10 His primary contributions relevant to this account
are twofold. First, Dagan employs pluralistic theories other than Raz’s to
formulate his concepts, and he also deploys Raz’s “value pluralism” to
support his theory of the state’s role in regulation.11 Value pluralism is
predicated on the notion that because there exists a plurality of universal
values, they cannot be ranked (incommensurable), and there is often
conflict between them.12 For our purposes, and in a simplified version, the

7

Id. at 375.
Joseph Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle, in JUSTIFYING
TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 155, 159 (Susan Mendus ed.,
1988).
9 Raz, supra note 2, at 18-19.
10 See e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory,
76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (2013).
11 Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1409, 1412 (2012).
12 GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND V ALUE PLURALISM 44–56 (2002) (defining
value pluralism based on four elements: (1) universal values (2) plurality (3)
incommensurability (4) in conflict); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (2002).
8
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relevant point is that because the world is composed of plural and diverse
universal values, human beings assign a variety of values to the same
experiences.13 Second, Dagan imports Raz’s observations to the privatelaw system, arguing that only a pluralistic approach can explain privatelaw doctrines and institutions. No single value can or should undergird the
private-law structure; only a variety of values, and the balance among
them, can serve as a foundation to the entire system of private law.
These two observations merge into one coherent theory concerning the
state’s role in supporting private-law institutions. Accordingly, Dagan
holds that pluralism is grounded in respect for diverse values, or different
balances of values, and in the promotion of autonomy that can only be
achieved by having adequate and meaningful choices.14 The role of
pluralistic private law “is to offer a rich repertoire of forms of human
interaction.”15 While the purpose of this structural pluralistic system is to
foster autonomy, the structure incorporates various values beyond
autonomy. Thus, Dagan asserts, the “law should facilitate (within limits)
the coexistence of various social spheres embodying different modes of
valuation.”16 At the same time, facilitating diverse legal options that
embed various modes of valuation is not tantamount to embodying freemarket principles. As Dagan notes, “[F]acilitation is rarely exhausted by
a hands-off policy and a corresponding hospitable attitude to freedom of
contract. Rather, facilitation requires the law's active empowerment in
providing institutional arrangements, including reliable guarantees
against opportunistic behavior.”17
Dagan’s insights are relevant beyond the scope of private law. They
can and should serve as guidelines for regulating matters that traditionally
fall under the rubric of public law, such as housing and transportation. The
state’s duty, as defined by Raz, is not limited, as between private parties:
it is the state’s role to assure the conditions for people to flourish.
Let us now see how pluralistic theory helps to illuminate issues
concerning the platform economy and to provide general guidelines for
that economy’s regulation.

13 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779, 780 (1994).
14 Dagan, supra note 11, at 1435.
15 Id. at 1432.
16 Id. at 1424.
17 Id. at 1429.
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THE SPECTRUM OF USE OF EXCESS CAPACITY

The platform economy expands valuable choice when it enables more
activities in use of excess capacity. By “excess capacity” I mean activities
that exploit the surplus of people’s unused or underused time, skills, or
assets to create “more capacity than the owner can herself use at once and
that can thereby be monetized.”18
Before I explain why one type of activity is choice-enhancing and the
other is potentially choice-decreasing, one should understand the extent
to which both activities—work in increased use of excess capacity and
traditional work—are dominant in platform activity. That is, a key aspect
of the platform economy, which we must take into consideration when
discussing its regulations, is the distinction between exchanges based on
leveraging surplus capacity and conventional exchanges that are not based
on increased use of excess capacity. By failing to distinguish them, and
by using terms such as “gig” or “sharing” economy, we blur the immense
differences between these activities and qualify similar legal treatment for
them. As stated, this is not merely semantics: platform firms often claim
that their function is mainly to enable “gigs,” i.e., work through increased
use of excess capacity. For example, in response to a court ruling that
found a New York City short-term rental, facilitated by Airbnb, illegal,19
Airbnb stated, “It is time to fix this law and protect hosts who occasionally
rent out their own homes. Eighty-seven percent of Airbnb hosts in New
York list just a home they live in—they are average New Yorkers trying
to make ends meet, not illegal hotels that should be subject to the 2010
law.”20 Airbnb’s supporters echo this idea by arguing that “[t]he services
help provide lower-cost lodging to visitors, while allowing property
owners to earn returns on underused assets.”21 Similarly, in court filings
Uber stated that the firm “merely provides a platform for people who own
vehicles to leverage their skills and personal assets and connect with other

See Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909,
929 (2017).
19 See City of New York v. Carrey, Nos. 13006002 and 1300736 (N.Y.C. Envtl.
Control Bd. May 9, 2013), https://www.scribd.com/document/142650911/Decision-andOrder-for-NOV-35006622J.
20 See Vacation Rental Site Airbnb Ruled Illegal in New York City, FOX NEWS
(May 21, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/travel/2013/05/21/airbnb-illegal-in-new-yorkcity.html.
21 Andrew Moylan, RoomScore 2016: Short-Term Rental Regulation in U.S.
Cities, R STREET POLICY STUDY NO. 55 (Mar. 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.pdf, at 1.
18
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people looking to pay for those skills and assets.”22
Although a vast portion of the work that platforms enable comprises
activities based on use of idle capacity, a large segment of that economy
encompasses full-time providers who use designated capital (goods
employed primarily for this purpose) or rely on their platform-economy
work as their main source of income. This segment of the platform
economy is large not only in terms of number of participants and
transactions but also because it yields a massive part of the platforms’
revenue. Moreover, despite rhetoric emphasizing the “gig” aspect,
platform firms, especially in the transportation sector, often encourage
commercial use; for example, by incentivizing drivers to work over 40
hours a week.23
Despite data limitations regarding the types of consumers and providers
in the platform economy, the data are clear about the coexistence of these
two types of activities (increased excess-capacity use and conventional
use without increased excess capacity) and their prominence. For
example, data on short-term rental platforms consistently show how
activities vary regarding the extent of underutilization by lessors. Most
properties offered by Airbnb lessors capitalize on their genuinely
underutilized assets, but a substantial minority use Airbnb to rent their
properties commercially. A study conducted by the Penn State University
School of Hospitality Management and funded by the American Hotel and
Lodging Association examined activities by lessors who posted properties
on Airbnb in fourteen large United States metropolitan areas, from
October 2014 to September 2015.24 The study divided “hosts” (lessors)
into three categories: those who offered an entire unit for a short time
during the year, those who offered a unit for the entire year, and those who
had two or more units on the platform. The results demonstrate that those
who work with designated capital (property whose primary use is for

22

Salovitz v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014).
23 Uber Launches Power Driver Rewards to Compete with Lyft, RIDESHARE
DASHBOARD, (Mar. 10, 2016), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2016/03/10/uber-launchespower-driver-rewards-to-compete-with-lyft/; Brenton J Malin & Curry Chandler, Free to
Work Anxiously: Splintering Precarity Among Drivers for Uber and Lyft, 10 COMMUN.
CULT. CRIT. 382, 391-92 (2016).
24 JOHN W. O’NEILL & YUXIA OUYANG, AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR
MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER SIDE OF AIRBNB
(2016),
https://www.ahla.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/
Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016.pdf.
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short-term rentals), although the minority, are consistently present across
all of the cities and are responsible for massive revenues for Airbnb. The
study found that 2,772 full-time operators (those who made their unit or
units available over 360 days a year) constitute 3.5% of the total lessors.25
While this may seem like a small number, Airbnb revenue from these fulltime operators was immense: in the period studied, they yielded
$347,479,616 for Airbnb, or 26% of Airbnb’s total revenue in those
locations.26 Furthermore, the study found that lessors who rented two or
more units for any amount of time constituted 16.1% of all operators.27
Finally, mega-operators, defined by the study as hosts who rent more than
three units (for any amount of time), constituted 6.5% of the hosts and
yielded 24.6% of Airbnb’s revenue, or $328,299,944, in those cities
during that period.28 Data on users in other cities confirm similar results.29
For the transportation platforms, data do not exist on how many drivers
monetize their underused private cars versus how many purchase a vehicle
primarily for commercial rides. Nonetheless, several programs offered by
platform transportation firms help drivers to access cars, which implies
that drivers with designated vehicles are not a marginal occurrence. Uber,
the largest platform transportation company, has programs enabling their
drivers to rent, lease, or buy a car.30 Uber’s Xchange leasing program
helps drivers with bad or no credit to lease a car,31 without mileage
restriction, and includes the maintenance of the vehicle.32 Similarly, Lyft,
Uber’s main competitor, maintains the Express Drive Rental Car
Program, which assists its drivers in renting a car.33 The rental price
depends on the number of hours the driver works for Lyft; the higher the
number of hours worked, the cheaper the rental price.

25

Id. at Key Findings.
Id. at Appendix: Data Tables, Jan. 2016 Report.
27 Id. at National Trends.
28 Id.
29 See Erez Aloni, Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy, 39 U. HAW. L.
REV. 315, 324 (2017).
30 See Vehicle Solutions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/vehicle-solutions/.
31
See Eric Newcomer & Olivia Zaleski, Inside Uber’s Auto-Lease Machine,
Where Almost Anyone Can Get a Car, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-31/inside-uber-s-auto-leasemachine-where-almost-anyone-can-get-a-car.
32 See Harry Campbell, Uber Vehicle Marketplace, RIDESHARE GUY,
http://therideshareguy.com/uber-vehicle-marketplace/.
33 See Express Drive Rental Car Program, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/enus/articles/218196557-Express-Drive-Rental-Car-Program-#cost.
26
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In addition to using goods and capital, providers in the platform
economy can either work full time or capitalize on their unused or
underused hours. The distinction in this case is between workers who use
their underutilized labor or skills by working for platforms part time—
selling labor-hours that are not available for their full-time job—and those
who work full time for platform firms, just as incumbent employees do.
Because most platforms do not provide accurate data about their
providers, we rely on alternative surveys and studies to understand the
work patterns in platforms. A study by the Requests for Startups group
surveyed approximately 900 workers in 78 platform firms, including
Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit.34 The authors examined the extent to
which providers depend on the income they earn from platforms. If
providers obtain most of their income from the platform, this is a good
indication that the platform is their main source of employment. Relying
partly on the platform income may indicate that it is a gig, a supplement
to their main job. The survey found that 39% of workers rely on platform
work for 25% of their income; 19% of workers surveyed earn 25–50% of
their income from platform firms; 13% of workers, 50–75%; and 29% of
workers, 75–100%.35 Thus, in terms of use of hours, the workers in the
platform economy reflect a spectrum in which some work part time, as a
gig, while almost 30% use platforms as their primary or sole source of
income. Similarly, a survey of approximately 600 Uber drivers, conducted
in December 2014, found that almost 40% of Uber drivers had no other
job; roughly 30% of drivers had another full-time job; and the other 30%
had another part-time job.36
In conclusion, data on the use of capital and the number of hours
invested in work reveal that activities in the platform economy lie on a
spectrum ranging from small gigs leveraging surplus all the way to
professional providers with designated capital who work commercially
through the platforms. Next, I argue that these activities produce different

34 Jennifer Rossa & Anne Riley Moffat, The Workers, BLOOMBERG BRIEFS (June
15, 2015), https://newsletters.briefs.bloomberg.com/document/4vz1acbgfrxz8uwan9/theworkers-demographics; Alison Griswold, Young Twentysomethings May Have a Leg Up
in the 1099 Economy, MONEYBOX (May 22, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/05/22/_1099_economy_workforce_report_
why_twentysomethings_may_have_a_leg_up.html.
35 See Rossa & Moffat, supra note 34.
36 Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for
Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States, 10 (Princeton Univ. Indust. Relations
Section, Working Paper No. 587, 2015) (describing a survey conducted by the Benenson
Survey Group per Uber’s request).
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levels of choice and negative externalities based on the level of increased
excess capacity they leverage.
III. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY AS A CHOICE-INCREASING
MECHANISM
Looking through the lens of pluralistic theory, we can see that one
virtue of the platform economy is that it extends valuable choices to both
consumers and providers. The platform economy, de facto, enables and
simplifies a set of activities, a sphere of exchanges based on transforming
idle capacity (goods, capital, or time) into work. By furnishing technology
that is available to many and relatively user-friendly, the platforms reduce
entry barriers (e.g., expenses) to excess-maximizing transactions and ease
the participation of nonprofessional providers. While work in increased
use of excess capacity existed long before the emergence of platforms, the
platforms make exchanges based on surplus between nonprofessional
providers easier and more efficient than before.
For consumers, the platform economy creates another layer of market
choice. Consumers have diverse needs, tastes, and preferences, and the
platforms expand options for them. In a PwC survey, 86% of respondents
familiar with the platforms agreed that they make life more affordable,
and 83% agreed that they make life more convenient and efficient. This
survey confirms that the platforms satisfy different needs and preferences
for consumers.37
Short-term rental platforms, for example, facilitate the option of staying
in someone else’s permanent home for a short period. In making this
alternative more easily available than it was before, this option appeals to
consumers who care more about price, as short-term rentals are often
cheaper than hotels. This opportunity is also attractive to travelers who
prefer experiencing a destination from a local resident’s point of view.
Conversely, other travelers may be more risk-averse and want to avoid
any problem stemming from dealing with private individuals, or they
prefer a hotel’s scenery or cleanliness, or they care less about cost. A
similar distinction applies to the transportation platform firms: they offer
another layer of choice to consumers. Some passengers prefer traditional
taxis, perhaps because they do not like waiting for a ride; or they perceive
taxis as safer; or they want to pay cash or do not have a smartphone. Yet,
37

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING
ECONOMY 20 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainmentmedia/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis-sharing-economy.pdf.
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others favor the lower cost of the platform rides and the technological
benefit of seeing where the driver is. It is not surprising, then, that in the
PwC survey, 32% of respondents indicated that “more choice in the
marketplace” is a strong selling point for the transportation platform
firms.38 The bottom line is that, through excess-capacity enhancement, the
platform economy provides more choice to consumers.
For providers, the platform economy offers the opportunity to work in
a flexible structure, in small gigs, to leverage unused time or skills as a
means to earn supplementary income. In other words, by reducing entry
barriers into industries that once required initial monetary investment as
well as some professional knowledge, the platform economy allows
nonprofessional players to maximize their underused skills, from driving
to cooking, to make extra income.
Flexible working hours are important to many workers across
industries. Researchers at the McKinsey Global Institute examined the
experience of freelancers in general (not only those working for
platforms) and found that independent contractors emphasized the
importance of flexibility and autonomy that this job framework offers.39
They elaborate, “Many earners strongly prefer the autonomy and
flexibility of independent work. They value being their own boss, setting
their own hours to some extent, and focusing on work that interests them
. . . . The Uber driver can fit his hours around a class schedule or family
priorities.”40 With regard to workers in the platform economy, they found
that, in the United States, 87% of those workers chose this working pattern
rather than resorting to it as a necessity (i.e., because they could not find
a different type of job). Data provided by Uber indicate that its drivers
appreciate the flexibility of their work. When drivers were asked how they
decide when to work, 40% answered that it depends on what else is on
their schedule.41 Thus, working as a freelancer in the platform economy
may increase choice for workers. Therefore, in line with pluralistic theory
that individuals put different values on different aspects of life, the
38

Id.

39 JAMES BUGHIN ET AL.,

MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE,
NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 61 (2016),
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and
%20Growth/Independent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20
economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy-Full-report.ashx.
40 Id. at 45.
41 Amy Levin, The Driver Roadmap: Where Uber Driver-Partners Have Been,
and Where They’re Going, BENENSON STRATEGY GRP. 3 (2014),
https://newsroom.uber.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf.
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platform economy boosts consumer and provider choice.

IV. THE PLATFORM ECONOMY IS ALSO A CHOICEDECREASING MECHANISM
The platform economy can also reduce alternatives for consumers and
providers. Because of the competition posed by the platforms’ suppliers,
some conventional services that are not platform-based are at risk of
becoming scarcer. The threat to traditional services is especially imminent
when platforms sanction commercial work (not using excess capacity). In
that case, and without regulation that protects incumbents from unfair
competition, traditional (non-platform–enabled) providers may not
withstand the competition; we can already see reduction in availability of
traditional services.
For instance, transportation platforms’ entry into the market has led to
a considerable decline in the number of taxi rides. One city that has
experienced a dramatic change in the availability of taxis is Los Angeles.
A report by the UCLA Labor Center found that between 2013 and 2014,
taxi ridership dropped by 18%, a total of 1.4 million fewer trips than in
the previous year.42 This number is likely larger currently because, at the
time of the study, platform-operated vehicles were not allowed to pick up
passengers from LAX airport, a location that constituted a large source of
taxi rides—while now they can. Los Angeles’s experience is typical of
many U.S. cities.43 The resulting financial struggles have forced cab
companies to fire workers, file for bankruptcy, and even close entirely,
making taxi services less available to the general public in some regions.44
The decreased availability of traditional taxis is detrimental to
consumers who feel less safe or are more likely to encounter
discrimination in obtaining services, particularly individuals from

42 Saba Waheed, et al., Ridesharing or Ridestealing? Changes in Taxi Ridership
and Revenue in Los Angeles 2009–2014, UCLA LABOR CTR. (2015),
http://www.labor.ucla.edu/downloads/policy-brief-ridesharing-or-ridestealing/.
43 Aloni, supra note 29, at 331 (describing similar experience in Seattle and
Arlington).
44 In 2016, San Francisco’s biggest taxi company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
See In re Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc., No. 3:16-bk-30063 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016);
see also Kate Rogers, Uber, Lyft Put Pressure on Taxi Companies, CNBC (Jan. 26,
2016, 1:10 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/26/uber-lyft-put-pressure-on-taxicompanies.html.
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minority groups. For instance, a recent study documented how African
Americans had a harder time obtaining Uber and Lyft rides compared to
their white counterparts.45 This study found that in Seattle, AfricanAmerican passengers had to wait longer before booking a ride via Uber,
up to 35% longer than white passengers. In Boston, the study used
passengers with African-American–sounding names and found that Uber
drivers cancelled rides more than twice as frequently as they cancelled
rides for passengers with white-sounding names. Certainly, racial
discrimination by traditional taxis is a familiar, well-established fact and
occurs on a regular basis.46 However, while a host of federal and state laws
discourage racial discrimination by traditional taxis,47 the applicability of
these laws to the platform-based rides, and to the firms themselves, is a
more contested question.48
People with disabilities constitute another group that has been harmed
by the disappearance or reduction of traditional taxi services. Stories
abound of incidents in which Uber drivers refused to take individuals with
disabilities, either because they had service animals or used a
wheelchair.49 Indeed, the National Federation of the Blind of California
filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of blind Uber customers, arguing that
Uber has violated the Americans with Disabilities Act; Uber replied that
the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to them. 50 While Uber
and Lyft have recently established programs to accommodate the needs of
passengers who rely on wheelchairs, some aver that these services are
rarely available.51
Finally, people who feel more vulnerable may believe that they are
45 See Yanbo Ge, et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation
Network Companies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22776, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22776.
46 See, e.g., Service Denied: Responding to Taxicab Discrimination in the District
of Columbia i, THE EQUAL RIGHTS CTR. (2003), https://equalrightscenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/taxicab_report.pdf
47 Aaron Belzer & Nancy Leong, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO.
L.J. 1271, 1297-98 (2017).
48 See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 85, 95 (2015).
49 See Jason Marker, Wheelchair Using Passenger Films Uber Driver Refusing to
Pick Him Up, AUTO BLOG http://www.autoblog.com/2017/01/10/wheelchair-usingpassenger-films-uber-driver-refusing-to-pick-hi/.
50 See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of California v. Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d
1073, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
51 See Heather Kelly, Uber’s Services for the Disabled Lack Actual Cars, CNN,
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/02/technology/uber-access/.
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safer taking taxis than using platform-enabled rides. Even though there is
no definitive evidence that taxis are safer than platform-facilitated rides
or that many people perceive taxis as safer, multiple publicized reports in
which platform drivers attacked, harassed, or refused to pick up minorities
may deter some from choosing this option.52 The firms’ refusal to
fingerprint their drivers, as taxi companies do, may bolster this
hesitation.53 The bottom line is that, for some people, the availability of
traditional taxis is still essential because the alternative is viewed as riskier
or because it is harder for them to get it.
In a similar fashion, short-term rental platforms threaten the existence
of valuable options in traditional accommodations, such as lower-end
hotels. Competition with the short-term rental platforms has endangered
less expensive hotels because the higher-end hotels are more likely than
platforms to attract businesspeople and wealthier tourists. A recent study
concluded that Airbnb’s impact on the hotel industry in Texas is unevenly
distributed because Airbnb threatens mostly lower-end hotels, making
them most vulnerable to economic harm.54 The declining options to stay
in such hotels can have the most serious impact on those who cannot
afford the more luxurious accommodation options or those who find it
harder to book a room through the short-term housing platforms. The
option of traditional hotels may be important for those who are not savvy
with technology and thus cannot, or do not want to, use platforms. Other
individuals may find that booking a room via a platform is more difficult
due to discrimination. Researchers recently found that users with names
perceived to be distinctively African American were 16% less likely to
succeed in booking a stay than were users with identical profiles but who

52 See Raymond Rizzo, Uber Driver James Henneberg is “Bothered” by the
“Transgender Thing”; Refuses to be Paired with Gay Couple in Future; Admits to
Lying, E. NASHVILLE NEWS (Jan. 7, 2017), http://eastnashville.news/2017/01/uber-driverjames-henneberg-is-bothered-by-the-transgender-thing-refuses-to-be-paired-with-gaycouple-in-future-admits-to-lying/; Mary Emily O’Hara, Lyft Driver Accused of
Threatening Activist Monica Jones in Transphobic Post, THE DAILY DOT (Feb. 28,
2016), http://www.dailydot.com/irl/lyft-driver-monica-jones-location-facebook/.
53
See, e.g., Heather Kelly, Uber CEO explains why he thinks fingerprinting
drivers is ‘unjust,’ CNNMONEY (June 24, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/23/technology/uber-travis-kalanick-gesfingerprinting/index.html.
54 See Georgios Zervas, Davide Prosperio & John Byers, The Rise of the Sharing
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30 (Boston U. Sch.
Mgmt. Research, Working Paper No. 2013-16, 2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898.
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had names considered to be distinctively white.55
Finally, consumers may find that the long-term residential rental
options in their own cities are decreasing as more owners convert longterm rental units to short-term rentals. This phenomenon of people who
invest in apartments to transform them short-term rentals has become
widespread, as evidenced, inter alia, by websites that advise potential
buyers on the cities in which this practice is most profitable.56
Communities and local governments have responded with calls for
regulations that restrain this phenomenon. Without expanding too much
on this, the rise of commercial short-term rentals has exacerbated the
shortage of rentals in many popular metropolitan areas and further
increased rental prices. Thus, while consumers enjoy more choice in
finding vacation rentals, they may face a problem securing long-term
rentals in their hometown.
Importantly, the platform economy can also reduce options for workers
by decreasing the number of full-time, protected employment
opportunities. Workers in the platform economy are not classified
“employees”; rather, their status is “independent contractor,” regardless
of the time or frequency they work for platform firms or the control the
firms retain over them.57 The different designation matters because the
status of “employee” guarantees various employment protections, such as
reimbursement of work-related expenses, overtime payment, employer
contributions to unemployment insurance, and a minimum wage.58
Indeed, one study surveyed providers in the platform economy and found
that “41 percent say they prefer the security and benefits of working for a
traditional company even if it might mean less flexibility.”59 Hence,
another tradeoff of the platform economy: increased flexible work
opportunities versus decreased availability of traditional employment.

55

See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination
in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 16-069, 2016), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16069_5c3b2b36-d9f8-4b38-9639-2175aaf9ebc9.pdf.
56 https://www.airdna.co/about (“Airdna provides data and analytics to vacation
rental entrepreneurs and investors.”).
57 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673, 1684-88 (2016).
58 See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073–74 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
59 See Press Release, Penn Schoen Berland, Forty-Five Million Americans Say
They Have Worked in the On-Demand Economy, While 86.5 Million Have Used It,
According to New Survey (Jan. 6, 2016), http://psbresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/On-Demand-Economy-Release.pdf.
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In conclusion, the platform economy simultaneously increases and
decreases options. Below, I examine what pluralistic theory teaches about
this composition of choice in the market.

V.

ENLISTING THE PRINCIPLES OF PLURALISM TO GUIDE
THE REGULATION OF THE PLATFORM ECONOMY

The platform economy enables activities that are different in their
utilization of excess capacity; and based on their location on the spectrum
of use, the exchanges contribute differently to the increase or the decrease
in choice. Pluralism prescribes that the state support the extension of
choice, which means actively endorsing the platform economy. But
support does not mean an invitation to embrace a deregulation regime.
The opposite is true: a truly pluralistic structure safeguards providers,
consumers, and traditional options from the negative externalities that
commercial-activity platforms produce. As Raz clarifies, a
nonintervention approach “would undermine the chances of survival of
many cherished aspects of our culture.”60 In our case, these “cherished
aspects” are the conventional services that may disappear as a result of
some businesses competing under different rules, while providing
virtually the same products and services.
Therefore, the first principle flowing from pluralism involves capturing
the distinction between activity through increased use of excess capacity
and work through activity not based on increased use. Specifically,
lawmakers should craft regulations that distinguish between activities
based on their location along the spectrum of use of increased excess
capacity. Regulations should prevent incumbent-like providers from
passing as increased-excess providers as a means to evade laws governing
traditional sectors.
Lawmakers can distinguish between the levels of use of increased
excess capacity by examining two factors together: the frequency of
supply and the infrastructure used for the transaction. The frequency
denotes the number of transactions the provider is involved in within a
defined period. The more frequently the supplier provides the goods or
services, the more likely that she is not working in increased excess
capacity. The other distinguishing factor is infrastructure: whether the
goods or real property is primarily designated for a commercial purpose
or only intermittently converted for such use. For instance, in the
60

Raz, supra note 2, at 162.
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platform-transportation sector, some municipalities have debated whether
to allow drivers to use their “personal vehicle” rather than a designated or
rental car.61 In the short-term rental market, some municipalities have
limited the number of nights that residents can lease their properties for
short-term stays. The assumption is that a small number of transactions
signals providers who leverage their surplus space, while those who
exceed this threshold operate commercially. In San Francisco, for
example, the threshold is 90 days a year.62
Pluralistic principles would also have the state treat each legal regime
differently according to the values the regime promotes. For activities of
increased use, lawmakers should endorse that innovation and its results
by allowing people to leverage their goods, time, and skills. Thus,
lawmakers are justified in treating each category differently. Lawmakers
should, therefore, create two (or more) different regulatory regimes based
on a spectrum of excess-capacity use. Activities based on increased excess
capacity should be regulated lightly and tailored to casual,
nonprofessional providers. Traditional work done through platforms
should be governed by the same rules as those for incumbents unless a
significant reason justifies a departure from such regulations.
For some types of critical matters, such as safety regulations, the
distinctions between levels of increased excess capacity may not matter.
In such matters, policymakers can reasonably insist that there is no
difference between work in increased excess capacity and other work. A
part-time driver can cause the same harm as one who drives regularly if
she drives an unsafe vehicle or without adequate insurance. Thus,
lawmakers should impose safety requirements—criminal-background
checks, vehicle inspections, insurance coverage—in a way that assures
public safety and reasonable allocation of risk. More generally, it means
that activities in increased use of excess capacity will be subject to
regulation that advances safety and prevents market failures. But the
regulations of such activities, to the extent possible, should be designed in
61 See, e.g., Order Instituting Rulemaking on Regulations Relating to Passenger
Carriers, Ridesharing, and New Online-Enabled Transp. Servs. (Cal. P.U.C. Dec. 27,
2012),
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M040/K862/40862944.pdf; Car
olyn Said, Uber, Lyft may face new rules in California, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
(April 5, 2016), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Uber-Lyft-may-face-newrules-in-California-7230320.php (reporting that “The PUC is poised to allow drivers to
use leased vehicles, but only if the lease is for more than four months.”).
62 See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(g)(1)(A) (2016).
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a fashion that minimizes obstacles for casual suppliers.
Except for core issues as safety, however, the regulations of activities
in increased use of excess capacity should differ from those imposed on
traditional transactions (whether or not operated through platforms). Hotel
tax provides an interesting test case on this point. San Francisco, like
several other municipalities, created a new set of rules governing shortterm rentals; it imposes on each transaction an occupancy tax (collected
by Airbnb) equivalent to that levied on hotels.63 However, regulations
may reasonably set different tax rates for various transactions, based on
the level of use of excess capacity, since transactions may vary in the type
of visitors they attract and in their use of municipalities’ infrastructures.
Hotels are more likely to draw businesspeople who use amenities such as
convention centers or performing-arts centers. Conversely, travelers who
turn to platforms to experience a location from a resident’s perspective
may be less likely to use some of these infrastructures. Airbnb units
offered by casual users may also be located in areas that are less touristic
in nature; thus, these regions receive less revenue from hotel tax. As
renting rooms or units on a short-term basis provides more business for
these less-visited locations, lawmakers can incentivize people to visit
these areas. Thus, unlike the path taken so far by most cities that collect
hotel tax on short-term rentals by platforms, pluralistic principles justify
creating a different tax rate for transactions based on casual use. Of
course, such casual exchanges may use some services that are funded by
hotel taxes; thus, a municipality can offer these providers a reduced tax
rate (rather than cutting it altogether). Alternatively, municipalities can
impose a tax equal to the regular hotel tax on short-term rentals located in
the central tourist zones, while creating a reduced tax rate for short-term
rentals in other zones. This should not create extra administrative burdens
or confusion because, in regulated regimes, lessors typically register their
units; the city can inform them of their hotel-tax rate at the time of
registration.
In a similar vein, in employment situations, pluralistic principles
suggest that lawmakers should treat full-time workers in the platform
economy differently than they treat casual providers in that economy. The
former are not substantially different from traditional employees. The
63 See Transient Occupancy Tax (TOT) Frequently Asked Questions for Hosts,
Website Companies and Merchants of Record, OFFICE OF THE TREASURER & TAX
COLLECTOR, CITY & CNTY. OF S.F.,
http://sftreasurer.org/tot_host_website_merchant_faq#1.
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platforms exert a level of control over these workers that is quite similar
to employers’ control over traditional employees.64 For instance, in the
transportation arena, Lyft and Uber exert more control over workers who
work voluminous hours by creating various programs that incentivize
their drivers to provide more hours a week.65 The flexibility and autonomy
of the “independent contractor” framework is diminished once the driver
is nudged to refuse riders. These drivers’ incomes also depend heavily on
the platform employer. Thus, when it comes to providers in the platform
economy who may or may not be not using their increased excess capacity
but, in any case, are essentially working full time (or nearly so) for an
employer, they should be recognized as traditional employees for the
purpose of benefits and protections. Indeed, some courts around the world
have determined that Uber drivers should be classified as employees.66
Further, casual workers (those truly leveraging their excess capacity)
should receive basic protections, as well. Pluralism calls for innovation
and a variety of options. While infrequent providers are more akin to
freelancers, essential norms and safeguards, such as minimum wage and
overtime pay, should still apply to them. A few commentators have
proposed that lawmakers create a special category, an intermediate level
between employee and independent contractor, that includes basic
employment protections and benefits.67 So far, even jurisdictions that have
regulated transportation platforms have not addressed the employment
status of drivers. This omission leaves the final decision about
employment status to the courts, which are limited in what they can do.
Courts can decide whether workers are classified as employees or
independent contractors but cannot create an intermediate status that
incorporates the distinction between those who work in increased use of
excess capacity and those who do not.
In addition to creating new content, a regulatory regime designed to
64

Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 57, at 1687.
See, e.g., Power Driver Bonus, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/enus/articles/214586477-Power-Driver-Bonus.
66 See, e.g., Reserved Judgment of the Employment Tribunal at 1, Aslam v. Uber
BV [2016] IRLR 4 (U.K. Empl. Trib.) (No. 2202551/2015), (ruling that Uber drivers are
“employed” as “workers” and not self-employed).
67 See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, BROOKINGS INST., A PROPOSAL FOR
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT
WORKER” 2 (2015), www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_
twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf; SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, RIGHTS ON DEMAND: ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER
SECURITY IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 10 (2015),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Rights-On-Demand-Report.pdf.
65
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foster increased excess-capacity transactions must be clear and easy to
follow and ought to impose minimal administrative burdens. The rules
should be crafted with awareness that casual providers are micro-earners
rather than sophisticated players with resources to hire legal counsel or
capacity to follow complex regulations. Such design would also prevent
the lost benefits that stem from evasion of the law when markets operate
underground, thus reducing revenue from tax collection and putting
workers and customers at risk.
In summary, pluralistic principles would separate transactions based on
where they fall on the spectrum of use of increased excess capacity. They
support the creation of a regime that boosts activities in monetizing idle
capacity and differentiates them from exchanges that pose as using
increased excess capacity but are actually akin to conventional
transactions.
CONCLUSION
The platform economy introduces a promise and a risk. Its promise lies
in facilitating transactions that are based on the use of increased excess
capacity. In so doing, it offers another layer of choice and makes it more
possible for people to be the authors of their own lives. When the platform
economy functions in this way, pluralistic principles call for letting these
activities flourish, with some regulation to ensure no harm to involved or
third parties. But the platforms too often turn a blind eye to, or encourage,
conventional commercial-work-in-disguise that is not grounded in
leveraging surplus capacity. In such cases, choice for consumers, workers,
and society at large can be reduced. Then, pluralistic principles call for
state intervention—through regulation—to prevent multiple harms and to
preserve valuable choice.

